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Abstract
A careful evaluation of diaries and
memoirs of British temporary officers in
World War I suggests that the class
consciousness and Regular Army ideals
inculcated during training had little bearing
on officers’ actual experiences on the front
lines. Their accounts confirm previous
scholars’ conclusions about the presence of
class feelings among officers, but the value
they place on military effectiveness in the
trenches is much more significant. After
1914, high casualty rates among junior
officers forced the British army to seek
candidates for commissions from social
classes that, before the war, would not have
been considered officer material. Accounts
from both the traditional officer class and
from the working class reveal new officers’
conscious attempts, encouraged by their
superiors, to conform to the pre-war Regular
Army ideal of the “officer and gentleman.”
These attempts, as well as the very existence
of the term “temporary gentleman,”
demonstrate the new officers’ consciousness
of their artificial elevation to the status of
gentlemen. But the diaries and memoirs
reveal that, on the front lines, an “efficient”

officer was highly valued, whatever his
social background.
Heavy casualty rates among junior
officers during the first year of World War I
forced the British army to seek officer
candidates from social classes not
previously thought to be officer material.
Most of these new officers were
commissioned from the ranks, for the
duration only, and the term “Temporary
Gentleman” was born. The origins of the
term are unclear, but it was in use in Britain
by 1916, when a book of letters was
published by the War Department under the
title A ‘Temporary Gentleman’ in France:
home letters from an officer at the front.1 It
is an interesting term – traditionally, if one
was a gentleman, one was born and died a
gentleman. The status was conferred by
birth and education. But status as an officer
in the British Army also indicated
gentlemanly status, the “officer and
gentleman,” and the connection continued
despite lower-class men being offered
temporary and artificial elevation to this
status. This research in part explores
personal accounts from both traditional
officer classes, with regular commissions,
and non-traditional officers commissioned
from the ranks, in order to assess officers’
consciousness of being or serving with
“Temporary Gentlemen” during the war.2
The officers’ accounts record either
their own or others’ efforts to conform to
ideals and behavior of Regular officers.
These attempts, as well as the very existence
of the term “Temporary Gentleman,”
demonstrate the new officers’ consciousness
of their artificial elevation to the status of
gentlemen. But the diaries and memoirs
reveal that, on the front lines, an “efficient”
officer was highly valued, whatever his
social background. A close examination of
these officers’ accounts, in conjunction with
contemporary accounts of officer training,

reveals an important distinction between the
practical and the pretentious. New officers
should conform to practical Regular Army
ideals of bravery, leadership and efficiency,
but should not pretend to be people they
were not by feigning interest in
horsemanship or emulating “public school
behavior” like manners and accent,
traditional markers of gentlemanly status.
Edwin Campion Vaughan’s diary,
particularly, indicates that there was little
time or patience at the front for arrogance or
pretension. Attempts to pretend in such a
manner generally resulted in snobbish
insults, even from fellow lower-class
officers.
The memoirs and diaries
demonstrate that social evaluation among
junior officers, on the front lines at least, had
become based on individual merit and
practicality, not on educational,
occupational, or family background.
Likewise, snobbishness tended to be
directed towards “inefficient” officers rather
than lowborn ones. That this change did not
persist after the war, and did not even
completely penetrate the upper ranks during
the war, illustrates its basis in practicality
and its origin in extraordinary circumstances
not found at home or in peacetime military
experience.3 As the phrase “Temporary
Gentleman” indicates, these officers’
elevation to the status of gentlemen was as
temporary and separate an experience as life
in the trenches, and when their particular
brand of military effectiveness was no
longer needed, their elevation was no longer
practical or valid. Whether these officers
were aware of the coming devaluation of
their status is uncertain, and it is more useful
and appropriate to concentrate on what they
do reveal about their front-line experiences.
A definition of Regular Army ideals, an
evaluation of secondary scholarship, as well
as an examination of propagandistic
documents published during the war, all

augment the information mined from the
officers’ accounts to paint a more complete
picture of the “Temporary Gentleman’s”
experience, origins, and class-consciousness.
It is important to understand pre-war
Regular Army tradition and conceptions of
gentlemanliness before analyzing how these
traditions and conceptions changed on the
front lines. In the Regular army, standards of
dress, speech and behavior differentiated
officers from men in the ranks. There was a
belief in the army that soldiers preferred to
be officered by gentlemen rather than by
those from their own class.4 Young men
from gentry and upper middle-class families
with public school and possibly university
education were considered officer material.
These men were typically “not used to much
brain work.”5 A background in hunting was
also highly valued, and competent riding
was an essential part of an officer’s life. An
independent income was essential, since
Army pay was not sufficient to provide
living expenses, let alone support necessary
equipment and expenses for polo, hunting,
and fine dining, and an officer was evaluated
by his peers based on his ability to maintain
the sporting and gentlemanly lifestyle.6
Financial restrictions alone excluded lowerclass men from seeking commissions, but,
had there not been monetary barriers, the
social and educational gaps were enough to
discourage the types of men who were
commissioned during World War I from
aspiring to commissions before the war.
There were three routes to permanent
commission in the Regular army that existed
both before and during the war – Sandhurst
(the Royal Military College), Woolwich (the
Royal Military Academy) and the Special
Reserve.7 Public schools and universities
had Officer Training Corps to prepare their
students for the military academies, so by
the time young officers were commissioned,
some had been training for assuming
military leadership roles since the age of

thirteen. Family background was also
important – most officers before the war
were sons of either gentlemen or military
professionals, and many were from families
well established in producing officers from
the young men of every generation.8
World War I trench warfare and its
command style relied heavily on junior
officers as platoon and section leaders on the
front lines. As a result, casualty rates among
officers were proportionally much higher
than rates among the men. Most of the
permanently commissioned Regular officers
died in the first year of the war. These
officers had to be replaced, but Sandhurst
and Woolwich were not producing enough
officers quickly enough.9 Temporary
commissions were issued to men from the
ranks, but in the beginning of the process,
before the system was reformed in the
summer of 1916, many of the officers were
middle-class ex-schoolboys and white-collar
workers commissioned directly from civilian
life who had no experience in the Army.10
Their ideas and examples of proper behavior
as an officer came not from experience
under officers on the front lines, but from
popular literature and largely romanticized
historical knowledge about British officers.
After the middle of 1916, orders were given
that all new temporary officers were to be
commissioned from the ranks, and the
candidates must be recommended by their
commanding officer.11 The order resulted in
increasing numbers of officers from
working-class backgrounds, with no
familiarity with upper levels of army social
hierarchy.
In 1917 Captain Basil Williams
wrote a propagandistic work explaining the
methods used in raising and training the
New Armies.12 This account of training
sought to reassure British readers and refute
attitudes that the quality of the New Army
and its temporary officers was deteriorating
as the war went on. These attitudes stemmed

from the connection that was still in place at
home in Britain, and among senior officers
who did not serve much on the front lines,
that ability to be an officer and a gentleman
was tied to social and educational
background.13 Experiences with training and
serving with “Temporary Gentlemen”
changed this perception. It was a meeting of
“two nations,” forcing interaction between
class groups who would have been highly
unlikely to socialize in peacetime.14 A prewar Regular officer compared training of
new officers from the ranks with this
dictum: “You can’t make a silk purse out of
a sow’s ear, but you can make a good leather
one.”15 He acknowledged that the new
officers were somewhat uncouth, and
although there is a degree of snobbishness in
calling them “sow’s ears,” their social
background did not prevent them from being
fully functional, strong officers on the front
lines. Silk (that is, horsemanship, manners
and breeding) would be nice, and had its
place in the Mess and regimental polo field,
but leather (bravery and effectiveness)
proved more practical and praiseworthy in
the trenches.
Robert Graves’s account of his war
experiences, found in his autobiography,
Goodbye to All That, illustrates quite
powerfully and humorously the conflict
between Regular army tradition and frontline effectiveness.16 The conflict, for Graves,
stemmed from a certain amount of Regular
army “childishness,” including strict Mess
rules and required riding lessons and polo
matches.17 At the same time, even though
certain aspects of this tradition were
ridiculous to him, he still would rather be
with this battalion than with any other.
Traditions of discipline and trustworthiness
were a part of the Royal Welch Fusiliers,
even though Graves humorously observed
that, regarding the war, “the Royal Welch
don’t recognize it socially.”18 Graves
acknowledges that adherence to certain

aspects of traditional officer life was silly
and unnecessary given the current style of
trench warfare, but other aspects, practical
and useful ones like strict discipline and a
reliable command structure, made a unit
much more effective and safe on the front
lines.
Graves was a Special Reservist with
the rank of captain with the Royal Welch
Fusiliers. His commission was a permanent
one – typically, officers commissioned from
the Special Reserves were carefully selected
and tended to be from the traditional officer
classes.19 Graves was educated at
Charterhouse, a public school, and came
from a reputable family, although several
close relatives were German, a fact Graves
attempted to hide when it seemed to put him
at a disadvantage (like in the war.) He was
not, then, a “Temporary Gentleman.” From
that position, his impression of the New
Army was unfavorable; he wrote, “ the
general impression here is that the New
Army divisions can’t be of much military
use.”20 He did admit, though, that their
clean, fresh appearance made his own
battalion feel like scarecrows – the New
Army units were inexperienced and untried,
and still looked polished and nice, but more
important to Graves was their military
effectiveness.21 He also had great scorn for
the Public School Battalions, filled with men
who were his social equals, but who were
incompetent at reading maps and patrolling.
He called the battalion and its officers a
“constant embarrassment” to the Brigade.22
“It is not fair,” he records one of his colonels
having said, “putting brave men like ours
alongside that crowd.”23 Graves’s
sentiments of snobbery are directed at
incompetence.
As the war continued, Graves was
struck with changes in his battalion – the
riding school for officers was abolished,
there were no Regular officers except for a
few “newly arrived Sandhurst boys,” and

manners were much more relaxed.24 He was
assigned an instructor job at an Officer
Cadet Battalion, one of many created in the
middle of 1916 to train recommended men
from the ranks and boys freshly out of the
public schools. Basil Williams argues in his
training account that the officer candidates
were treated equally, despite differences in
social background. This equality placed
everyone on equal footing and produced
effective leaders.25 Graves’s experiences as
an instructor convinced him that, though the
officers had deteriorated from the
“regimental point of view, [that is, from the
strict social standards of the Royal Welch,]
their greater efficiency in action amply
compensated for their deficiency in
manners.”26 The test he and the other
instructors administered to judge passage or
failure of the course was a soccer or rugby
game, and those who “played rough but not
dirty” and had quick reactions passed and
were commissioned. These standards of
officer material are quite different from, and
distinctly more practical than, pre-war
standards of birth and education. 27
Siegfried Sassoon, like Graves, held
a permanent commission from the Special
Reserves and served in the Royal Welch
Fusiliers, although usually in a different
battalion from Graves. Their backgrounds
are similar in many ways, although Sassoon
was a practiced rider and huntsman from the
country, a crucial requisite for commission
before the war, while Graves was not. They
were friends and fellow poets, and both
shared the burden of German names in an
anti-German war – Graves’s surname
technically included “von Runicke.”
Sassoon left both memoirs and a published
diary describing his war experiences. In his
memoirs, written in the late 1920s, Sassoon
calls the term “Temporary Gentleman” a
“disgusting phrase.”28 Yet, while many of
his sentiments toward new temporary
officers mirrored Graves’s, Sassoon is

distinctly more socially snobbish than
Graves in his account of his fellow officers.
Perhaps his awareness of belonging to the
hunting-man elite and his upbringing
completely separate from lower class people
were factors. One entry, describing his
February 1918 trip over to France after leave
in Palestine, states that there were “very few
intelligent, sensitive faces” about, and calls
his fellow officers “riff-raff,” complaining
that they are always playing poker in the
Mess.29 A similar passage appears two years
earlier, in May of 1916:
Of all the officers having dinner, I saw no
face with any touch of distinction in it.
They were either utterly commonplace or
self-satisfied, or else tired-looking, feeble,
goggle-eyed, or otherwise deficient. Why
does one see so few proper-looking
officers?30
He disapproves of self-satisfied,
pretentious behavior. But, despite this
disdain for other officers’ manners, it is
crucial to note that, right after he deplores
their “feeble” or “deficient” appearance, he
states, “Yet, our army does all right.” While
the admission is in this case somewhat
grudging, Sassoon makes the distinction
between evaluating soldiers based on doing
“all right,” and evaluating based on manners
and appearance. While both bases may have
been valid to him, practicality won out in the
trenches. In his diary, Sassoon recorded a
story about a former lance corporal in his
battalion who had recently been
commissioned. This officer arrived on
parade drunk. Sassoon found him to be a
bad officer, “quite irresponsible and not
trustworthy,” and disdained his habit of
swaggering about, making vulgar
comments.31 Not only are this officer’s
manners offensive to Sassoon, but his lack
of military discipline and effectiveness as
leader disgust him as well.

Another illustration of this habit of
Sassoon’s to actually couple social snobbery
with more practical evaluations can be found
in his memoirs, in his reactions to several
fellow officers. G. Vivian-Simpson was a
volunteer temporary officer, formerly a bank
clerk, who was irritatingly keen to “air his
social eligibility,” yet was potentially a
competent officer. Sassoon points out that
he later proved greedy and unreliable, and
he was shot at Ypres on his way to a second
breakfast.32 Another officer, Mansfield, had
style and fire in his word of command,
although he was not from a hunting
background like Sassoon, whose “view
halloa” was passable but whose word of
command was initially unconvincing.33 He
later compared two other fellow officers,
Rees (a short, uncouth Welshman) and
Shirley (a former public school boy). Rees
got on Sassoon’s and Shirley’s nerves with
his table manners, but Sassoon found that
social incompatibilities merged on the front
lines into “communal discomfort.” In the
trenches, Rees was the better of the two,
making jokes and talking incessantly to keep
up his courage, while Shirley, “true to the
traditions of his class,” simulated a
nonchalance that he could not get into his
eyes.34
Samuel Hynes has argued that an
upper middle-class background and public
school education were actually a liability on
the front lines, just as Sassoon points out in
the case of Shirley. At these schools, boys
are trained to repress outward signs of
emotion, if not to suppress the entire
emotion itself.35 Contemporary research into
shell shock and war-induced breakdown
indicated that suppression of emotion eroded
an officer’s mental defenses over time, and
could cause psychological problems bad
enough to warrant leaving the lines and
going to a hospital.36 There is a particularly
descriptive account of this in Charles
Carrington’s memoir, in which he narrates

his close brush with mental breakdown
during a night and day of heavy shell fire,
brought about by his frantic efforts to
repress his fear and appear nonchalant. 37
This incident indicates that he is probably
from a public school background. His
educational and social background before
the war is not given to the reader. He
attended Oxford University soon after the
war ended, where he wrote a large part of
his memoirs, although they were not
published until 1930.
Carrington appears in his memoirs as
Charles Edmonds, much in the same way
that Sassoon appears in his own as George
Sherston. He was originally a private in a
volunteer regiment, evidently with no
previous military background, but his
anxiety to get to France was frustrated by his
regiment’s quartering in Britain. He “got
[his] uncle to pull some strings” and was
given a commission in another regiment.38
Carrington’s perspective on “Temporary
Gentlemen” is interesting, then, because it is
uncertain whether he was considered one
himself. He does not directly admit to being
one (in fact, none of the writers directly use
the phrase “Temporary Gentleman” in their
accounts, besides Sassoon, in his memoir
written much later) and he cheerfully states
that, “if it was fun to be a Tommy, it was ten
times more fun to be a subaltern in
Kitchener’s Army. There was scope….”39
The memoirs are largely unconcerned with
other officers or Carrington’s perceptions of
them. Much more than Graves or Sassoon,
Carrington was concerned with how his men
and noncommissioned officers judged his
own leadership. In fact, he was happiest
when he was isolated with his men in
situations where distinctions of rank broke
down.40 He frequently deferred to his
sergeants and veteran privates when he was
uncertain about what orders he should give,
and often mentions his efforts to “keep up
appearances” in front of his men and fellow

officers.41 From context these “appearances”
equate with bravery. “Windiness,” or fright,
was a sign of weakness for him, which he
sometimes applied to himself but never to
his fellow officers.
It would be an oversight not to point
out that Carrington’s work is full of pride in
traditional military discipline and regimental
enthusiasm. One interesting episode in his
memoirs is the appearance of a colonel in
the trenches with Carrington and his men.
Carrington admired the colonel – in fact, he
calls him his hero. It is important to note
what precisely Carrington admired – the
colonel’s clothes, horsemanship, “incisive”
speech, and his adventurous past in the Boer
War.42 The romantic image of the Regular
officer was still very powerful in the minds
of soldiers and temporary officers, and
Carrington assigns to the colonel’s attributes
the power of restoring calm in the line at a
time of particular panic and trouble. He
compares the colonel to a Caesar who
“snatched up a shield and stood in the ranks
of the Tenth Legion.”43 Even in this
somewhat romantic account of the colonel’s
appearance, Carrington attributes great
importance to his ability to calm the soldiers
in the trenches. His social status as an
officer and a gentleman was clearly
acknowledged and admired, but it was
admired for its tangible effects on discipline
and morale. This episode is similar to
Graves’s account of his first impressions of
the Welch Fusilier officers, although Graves
was antagonized, while Carrington was
uplifted.44 Regular army traditions that
resulted in good front-line discipline and
morale were traditions highly sought after
and properly emulated by new junior
officers.
Carrington’s account is interesting
and challenging to analyze for evidence of
class-consciousness because snobbery is
nearly absent in this work, as are
descriptions of people’s social background.

Instead, during training (and afterward,
although he does not admit this) he “paid
blind hero worship to any soldier who would
teach [him] his trade.”45 A useful conclusion
can be drawn from that. “Any soldier”
includes working-class privates and
noncommissioned officers just as much as it
includes colonels. Carrington is exclusively
concerned with narrating his own
development as an effective leader. During
his initial training, he and the other new
officers “carried [them]selves with no end of
swagger, each trying to be the devil of a
fellow.”46 Later, during a successful
maneuver for which he was later decorated,
Carrington’s pride derives from functional
military discipline. “All the messages which
I had proudly composed in such careful
military form [had] gone astray,” he
writes.47 His shift to the use of bravery,
experience and efficiency as bases of
judgment, rather than conformation to
Regular army social standards, illustrates his
conviction that effectiveness in the trenches
made a line officer good, just as it made an
enlisted soldier good.
Edwin Campion Vaughan’s diary is
similar to Carrington’s account in its focus
on practicality, although it is far more
critical in tone. Vaughan was commissioned
at age 19 into the Royal Warwickshire
Regiment in late 1916. From an introduction
to his published diary, one learns that he was
the son of an Irish Catholic customs officer,
and was educated in a Jesuit school.48 He
would not have been considered officer
material before the war both for his religious
conviction and for his inferior parentage.
He was commissioned from the ranks, as all
new officers were after 1916, but his diary
begins with his first days as an officer on the
way to France, where he seemed to be going
for the first time. Most likely, then, his time
as a private was spent exclusively in
England.

Given Vaughan’s inexperience with
army life on the Western Front and his
general inexperience with army traditions as
a result of his lower middle-class
background, he was forced to develop his
own standards of judging himself and others
in leadership positions in a way that Sassoon
and Graves were not. Additionally, unlike
Carrington, who was similarly
inexperienced, there was little difference
between the social class of Vaughan and that
of many of his men. Therefore, it is useful to
trace both Vaughan’s reaction to other
officers and other officers’ reactions to him.
Vaughan had a difficult time getting along
with his fellow officers in France. On one
occasion, after marching his men several
miles through a storm, he reached
headquarters only to be ignored by the
officers inside after he came in to ask for
directions. Vaughan became “cross,” and
informed the Staff Lieutenant that he was
entitled to more courtesy than he had been
shown, and that his troops were out in the
cold. After what he considered to be an
inadequate response, Vaughan called the
officers “inefficient” for failing to organize
proper quarters for his men and told them to
go to hell.49 Vaughan’s anger in this
situation is in part due to the lack of respect
shown to him, but he lays more importance
on the officers’ lack of concern for his men.
He is distinctly arrogant here, and the
arrogance derives from his disdain for
inefficiency. Vaughan’s account of another
officer, this time “Second Loot,” further
illustrates Vaughan’s scorn for officers who
fail to act responsibly. The new officer,
upon arrival, performed a “long, slow stage
salute” to the commanding officer and
addressed everyone in stilted, pretentious
tones:
Sir. I am pleased and proud to have the
honour of meeting you in the scene of
operations. And I can assure you that I will

do my best to serve you, and my king, at a
top rate. I’ve crossed over to make good and
to help the old country all ends up.50
Vaughan saw this behavior as
ridiculous and impractical. The new arrival
was originally a commercial traveler from
Birmingham (one of the few direct
references to people’s backgrounds in
Vaughan’s diary) and later “ran off” after
receiving a slight wound. Vaughan wished
this pretentious but unsubstantial officer
“good riddance.”51 He views a Captain
Taylor with similar scorn, and for similar
reasons. Captain Taylor (whom Vaughan
calls, “the poor thing”), intentionally spoke
to “no one below his own rank” and took a
condescending tone with young officers.52
Vaughan views these figures, both
attempting to distinguish themselves by
emulating what they think are proper
Regular army codes of behavior for officers,
as pitiable and intolerable men whose
pretensions did not contribute usefully to
front-line effectiveness.
Vaughan’s diary indicates that he
initially felt a certain pressure to conform to
his superiors’ ideals of officer behavior.
When asked to join a ride to a nearby town,
he states, “… although I had never been on a
horse before, I did not like to refuse.”53
There was still a significant connection
between being an officer and being a
competent horseman. Robert Graves also
experienced this during his time with the
Royal Welch, when, since he didn’t “ride
like an angel,” he participated in a riding
school every afternoon in billets.54 Later in
the war, his battalion stopped the riding
school, which occurrence Graves explains as
one of many losses of pre-war tradition due
to the dearth of Regular officers who
actually cared that these traditions were
kept. Riding was a tradition that had
practical use during marches and transport,
but no use at all in actual trench warfare. In

Vaughan’s regiment, riding lessons were
still required. His ineptitude at riding
became evident after that first day’s ride,
and Vaughan frequently mentions being
forced to attend lessons, which often
provided humor. During one lesson, “the
whole village was startled by a cavalcade of
shaggy horses clattering through the main
street with purple-faced young officers
clinging to their saddles. We had no more
riding instruction.”55
Evaluating other officers’
assessments of Vaughan is equally as
important as evaluating Vaughan’s
assessments of his colleagues. Vaughan
chose to record several situations in his
diary that embarrassed him or enraged his
sense of self-respect. One account is of a
mistake he made and a resulting lecture ten
days later from Pepper, a senior officer.
Vaughan was short on wiring supplies, and
telephoned to Headquarters to ask for more.
He gave his unit’s exact location (which was
forbidden in case the Germans had gotten
access to the telephone lines) and was
immediately hung up on. Later he was
summoned to Headquarters, and he thought
perhaps he was up for a promotion for his
diligence in wiring. Instead, he encountered
a group of staff officers who deliberately
embarrassed him by asking, “who on earth is
this?” when he arrived, although they clearly
knew. An officer named Hoskins then began
lecturing him about not being stupid enough
to give secrets to the Germans. Vaughan’s
reaction to this situation is revealing. “Now,
Hoskins,” he wrote, “is only a 2nd Lieutenant
acting Captain, and he’s never done any
service in the line. So I wasn’t inclined to
take a choke off from him.” Vaughan
interrupted Hoskins, saluted the
commanding officer, and walked off.56 He
was lectured again ten days later. Pepper
told him that the other officers despised his
“arrogant unsociableness” and saw him as
an “inefficient young officer.” This was

because he, Vaughan, was still an
“inexperienced young urchin” and did not
show proper respect for others who had been
out for months or years.57 When reading this
lecture, one is reminded of his first
encounter at headquarters, where he called
the officers inefficient and told them to go to
hell. Vaughan, of course, records that the
lecture was unwarranted, and that his
mistake was due to ignorance.
Snobbishness played an important
role in Vaughan’s army experience. He was
sometimes on the receiving end, as in the
subjection to riding lessons and his
treatment at Headquarters, but when he was
the one belittling others, his feelings of selfimportance derived from his disdain of
irresponsibility or effectiveness. The
problem was, in most instances, including
the lecture after his telephone blunder, he
saw his own efforts at leadership to be far
superior to the other officers’. That Pepper
lectured him for not showing enough respect
to those more experienced than him
illustrates Vaughan’s initial inability to
conform to a new sort of social hierarchy
that developed in the trenches, where
deference was given to seasoned veterans
and those with practical and effective
leadership skills. Charles Carrington notes
this deference in his account, recording that
he was quite willing to consult his veteran
noncommissioned officers when there were
no other officers around to issue orders.
With a new social hierarchy based on
experience and practicality, there was a new
form of snobbishness. Vaughan’s arrogant
attitude was seen as ridiculous early in his
service in France because he lacked the
experience to justify it – he was pretentious,
although seemingly not intentionally so.
And, as has been seen in the other officers’
accounts, no pretentiousness of any kind
was appreciated on the front lines.
If class-consciousness is nearly
absent in Edwin Campion Vaughan’s diary,

it is glaringly present in A “Temporary
Gentleman” in France: home letters from an
officer at the front. This account was
published by the War Department in Britain
in 1916, and reprinted in 1918 for American
audiences. It is presented in the form of
narrative letters from an officer who even
signs himself “Your ‘Temporary
Gentleman,’” collected and published by
Captain A. J. Dawson. If one analyzed this
document in the same way as the four
others, without knowledge of its origins or
intent, one would draw quite a different
conclusion about class-consciousness among
officers. But this document is properly
analyzed as a propaganda piece proposing
the War Department’s official stance on
“Temporary Gentlemen” and showing the
government’s attempt to glorify these
officers and reassure the public. A detailed
account of the officer’s background and
upbringing (including his widowed mother’s
noble sacrifices for his education and his
own job as an auctioneer’s clerk) precedes
an account of his patriotic enlistment in the
army. With a nod to the new system of
commissioning from the ranks, this work
points out that, like the protagonist, there
were many hundreds of men in the ranks
who had the makings of a good officer.58
The “Temporary Gentleman” has a jolly
time in France, bravely doing his duty,
cheerfully reminding his readers that the
New Army is perfectly competent, happy to
be considered an officer and a gentleman,
and in the end returning safely to England
with a wound. The existence of this account
confirms the existence of the term
“Temporary Gentleman” by 1916. It is
surprising, given the term’s existence at the
time, that the officers’ accounts do not
mention it more often. Perhaps they all
found the term as “disgusting” as Siegfried
Sassoon did in his memoirs.
“Temporary Gentlemen” knew that
their status as gentlemen, like their

commissions, ended when the war was over.
Martin Petter has traced significant social
problems after the war to the fact that when
these “Temporary Gentlemen” were
demobilized, they were “de-officered” as
well, and returned to their civilian lives and
jobs (if the jobs were still available, and
many were not) as working-class men who
took orders, not gave them.59 An
understanding of the nature of the problem
faced by soon-to-be former officers cannot
be gained without an understanding of how
these temporary officers came to be
commissioned and how they saw
themselves. They were elevated to officer
status out of necessity, because the British
army had no other choice. Their evaluations
of themselves and other officers were based
on battle experience and effectiveness as
leaders, and more traditional officers like
Sassoon and Graves admitted that their lack
of social graces was compensated by their
effectiveness in the field. Likewise, an
inefficient officer was useless, whatever his
background. Robert Graves retained his
position at the Officer Cadet Battalion after
the war was ended, since training of men
from the ranks did not stop right away. He
notes that the post-war arrivals were “a
constant cause of shame,” with ghastly table
manners and drunkenness on parade.60
Graves has reverted to pre-war evaluations
of officers, since wartime evaluations were
no longer practicable. These particular
candidates were not given any chance to
improve and show their effectiveness in the
trenches. The new standards of evaluation
that developed as the war went on, which
are so obvious in accounts like Graves’s and
Vaughan’s, ended with the Armistice.
World War I created a new social
hierarchy in the trenches – in a sense,
instead of taking one’s birth and upbringing
into account, the new standards took into
account one’s record of service in the
trenches. An officer’s “birth” was his first

tour of duty on the front lines. In that sense,
the war was a social leveler. Siegfried
Sassoon wrote, “things were being said and
done which would have been considered
madness before the war. The effects of the
War had been the reverse of ennobling, it
seemed. Social historians can decide
whether I am wrong about it.”61 Social
historians have concluded that the
experience of the British “Temporary
Gentleman” was one tinged with social
snobbery, and yet they also argue that these
new officers were seen as good leaders and
refute the claim that officer quality
deteriorated as the war went on.62
Recognition of the new standards of
evaluating officers, based on practical skills
and leadership, is part of the solution to this
seemingly self-contradictory and thus
incomplete conclusion. The pre-war
traditions of officer behavior operated in
parallel, but with a distinct disadvantage, to
these new, more practical traditions, creating
a complex system of snobbery based in both
systems. These sets of traditions were
largely mutually exclusive, except in
instances where, as in Graves’s and
Carrington’s accounts, pre-war traditions of
discipline and command structure prove
useful in the trenches. Thus, consulting these
officers’ accounts in order to answer the
question of whether “Temporary
Gentlemen” were conscious of their own
inferior social class and whether it affected
their performance on the front proved to be
too simplistic an approach. Temporarily, in
the trenches, social class had ceased to be
the measure of an officer.
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